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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent emergence of this nation's environmental concern has 
been a rather dramatic awakening, and many cynics who had 
shrugged off the environmental movement as simply a passing fad 
have learned that the country will no longer condone disregard for 
its natural environs. Protecting the environment is now a concern 
of virtually every major business, every legislative body, every gov-
ernmental or administrative agency, and an enormous section of the 
populace. 
This new-found awareness represents a clear change in our basic 
approach to growth. The United States, and perhaps the world as a 
whole, can no longer ignore the environmental consequences of 
growth decisions. Yet, due to the enormous complexity of the prob-
lems involved, our less-than-perfect knowledge of the interrela-
tionships between various human activities and the environment, 
and the numerous tradeoffs that must be made in opting for envi-
ronmentally sound choices, the decision-making process has become 
staggeringly difficult. Undoubtedly, great consternation surrounds 
the questions of how and by whom these choices are to be made. 
Despite recent improvements in the governmental decision-
making process, such as the impact statement required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),! there still 
remains a large ground swell of discontent among those who are 
concerned with the environment. Perhaps this is the result of the 
naturally slow rate of change inherent in the bureaucratic process. 
The achievement of basic changes in environmental decision-
making, whether public or private, is extremely slow and often 
frustrating. As a result, a number of individuals have expressed 
concern that environmental causes must be championed in a dif-
ferent method. One such method that has been found to be both 
expeditious and effective is the use of citizen and public interest 
group lawsuits directed against alleged polluters, thereby enabling 
the courts to examine environmental disputes on their merits. 
Given environmental awareness and the publicity surrounding 
citizen suits, it is not unusual for the attorney to be approached by 
clients who seek to prevent some environmentally-damaging activ-
ity. Often these clients simply wish to protect the environment. 
Perhaps, as often, they seek to use the environmental banner to 
obtain another goal, such as a desire to impede development. What-
z 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1970). 
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ever the client's motives, he seeks counsel as to how he can best 
institute legal or administrative action to accomplish his goals. 
Environmental suits, however, cannot be fully considered without 
first addressing the question of costs. In light of the nature and 
importance of the issues involved, substantial public input into en-
vironmental decision-making is desirable. However, if citizens are 
effectively to utilize the courts as vehicles for protecting the environ-
ment, then some method of financing this litigation must be consid-
ered. 
If the attorney has made the initial decision that the client has a 
meritorious case, he must next address himself to the sources of 
funding for this potential litigation. In this connection, several alter-
natives for financing are available depending on the number ofpeo-
pIe affected by the environmental problem, the monetary resources 
of the client and other injured parties, and whether the potential 
defendant is a private citizen or a governmental authority. Ideally, 
of course, the client should be independently wealthy and able to 
fund the entire litigation process. However, the probability of hav-
ing such a client is the exception rather than the rule. The lawyer 
is most likely to be confronted with a client that has insufficient 
resources. 
Assuming that the attorney is approached by a client who is un-
able to support the costs of litigation, several courses of action are 
available. Counsel could direct the client to a public interest law 
firm.3 Relative to private firms, however, public-interest law firms 
are few in number, and in many parts of the country, there are no 
public interest firms at all. Even those that do exist have heavy 
case loads and may not be in a position to take on the individual's 
particular problems. A more common choice would be for the client 
to obtain organizational support through which the litigation could 
be funded. Here, too, there is more than one option. The most 
expeditious route to organizational support would be to persuade an 
existing environmental group to champion his cause. However, most 
existing organizations are involved in projects to the full extent of 
their budgets and are very selective in taking on new cases. As an 
alternative, the client may wish to consider creating an environmen-
tal organization to support the litigation. 
This article will examine the feasibility of this latter alternative, 
3 For a discussion of the position of the public-interest law firm vis-a-vis the tax provisions 
discussed later in this article, see Section m C (I), infra. 
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its benefits and its shortcomings. The discussion will focus on the 
structural, tax, and jurisdictional considerations involved in estab-
lishing an organization to fund environmental litigation. 
II. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FORMATION OF THE NEW 
ORGANIZATION 
A. Generally 
If the new organization route is chosen, the initial task of the 
attorney is to explore fully the nature and scope of the environmen-
tal injury. This is necessary in order to ascertain all prospective 
plaintiffs. The class of prospective plaintiffs may include such di-
verse groups as the client's neighbors, residents across town, envi-
ronmental organizations, business interests, and others. In some 
situations, the number of persons within the category of injured 
plaintiffs may be so large that it will be prudent for the attorney 
initially to limit the scope of the organization's membership. The 
limiting factor could be based upon geography, the extent of injury, 
or any other logical characteristic that is presented by the facts. 
An important caveat must be kept in mind, however. In order for 
the hypothetical organization to qualify under the tax laws for ex-
empt status, it must serve a public rather than a private purpose.4 
It is necessary for the organization to establish that it is not organ-
ized or operated for the benefit of certain designated individuals. 
This immediately should alert the attorney to the necessity of 
broadly defining the purpose of the organization, and hence the 
membership.5 This important limitation negates the possibility of 
using a tax-exempt organization to fund environmental litigation 
when the injury is limited to readily identifiable individuals. The 
tax-exempt device is also likely to be unavailable if the suit is one 
for damages rather than equitable relief, since the outcome of a suit 
for damages seldom has a direct benefit to the public at large. Thus, 
the attorney should consider whether the contemplated suit is one 
that is "publicly" oriented or one which emerges purely from private 
fears. 
If an environmental organization is suitable and desired by the 
client, as counsel you must advise the aggrieved parties as to the 
optimal type of organizational structures available from which they 
can direct their activities. The organizational form should be suffi-
• The tax aspects of this problem are discussed fully in Section m, infra. 
• See Section II C, infra. 
1978] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 461 
ciently flexible to permit inclusion of new members, receipt of dona-
tions, limited personal liability of the participants, and the most 
favorable tax posture for the group's financial activities. 
B. The Non-Profit Organization 
A major decision to be made is whether this organization is to be 
non-profit or not. Since our hypothetical client is a person of modest 
means, choice of the non-profit charitable category, regardless of the 
ultimately selected organizational form, would be most advanta-
geous. Several privileges are associated with non-profit charitable 
status: (1) possible freedom from most of the burdens of federal 
income tax;8 (2) possible exemption from real property and other 
state taxes;7 (3) exemption from labor union collective bargaining 
rules in many states as well as under the National Labor Relations 
AcW (4) potential immunity from tort liability for the negligence of, 
or other harm caused by, the organization's agents to the extent 
permissible by state law;9 and (5) the privilege to solicit donations, 
gifts, bequests, and contributions. lo On the other hand, certain dis-
advantages result from the restrictions imposed by the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS)l1 and by state and local governments on the non-
profit charitable organization's activities. 
Generally, for purposes oflocallaw, non-profit organizations must 
meet a motive test. All profit-makingl2 and investment incentivesl3 
• See Section III, infra. 
7 See, e.g., Sahara Grotto & Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 147 Ind. App. 471, 
261 N.E.2d 873 (1970)(test for determining whether certain property is exempt from property 
tax is whether dominant use of such property is for purposes which are exempt); State Board 
of Tax Comm'rs. v. Trustees of Adoniram Lodge of Perfection, 140, Ancient Accepted Scottish 
Rite, 145 Ind. App. 300, 250 N.E.2d 605 (1969) (fraternal organization was using its property 
for the dominant purpose of charity and was therefore exempt from property tax). See gener-
ally E. FISCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACTER, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 786 (1974). 
• 29 u.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). 
• See, e.g., Middlesex Concrete P & E Corp. v. Cartevet Indus. Ass'n, 37 N.J. 507, 181 A.2d 
774 (1962) (trade association was privileged to interfere with the business of a third party in 
order to protect the interests of its members or of the public). However, it should be noted 
that there is a definite trend in the law to limit the immunity of charitable organizations on 
the theory that persons injured through the negligence of employees of a non-profit corpora-
tion should have some redress, and that insurance can relieve the organization of the fears of 
bankruptcy. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS, § 133 (4th ed. 1971). 
I. See generally E. FISCH, supra note 7, at § 738. 
" The restrictions imposed by the IRS are dealt with in depth in Section III B, infra. 
12 In re Letts' Estate, 200 Cal. App. 2d 708, 713, 19 Cal. Rpt.502, 505 (1962), held that a 
college's acceptance of donations in consideration of its issuance of annuities and life income 
contracts to donors did not deprive it of its status as a tax-exempt non-profit institution as 
long as no part of its net income inured to the benefit of any private person. 
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for its members must be eliminated. However, it is not necessary 
that profit be eliminated from all activities of an organization for it 
to achieve non-profit status, as long as income is employed solely 
to further the non-profit purpose of the enterprise. 14 
The alternatives available in choosing the type of non-profit or-
ganization that best fits the client's needs are several. The common 
forms are: (1) an individual charitable enterprise; (2) an associa-
tion; (3) a corporation; (4) a foundation; and (5) a charitable trust. 
In attempting to choose a form suitable for the client of meager 
resources, alternatives (4), the foundation, and (5), the charitable 
trust, may be summarily dismissed. Foundations and charitable 
trusts are generally formed by individuals or groups providing testa-
mentary or inter vivos endowments from which the organization can 
fund its activities. Nor is alternative (1), the individual charitable 
enterprise, a satisfactory form for carrying out our objectives, since 
charitable deductions generally are allowed only to a formally or-
ganized entity such as a trust, corporation, or association. For exam-
ple, contributions to an informal group aiding servicemen have been 
disallowed the deductional privilege. 15 As our hypothetical organiza-
tion will most probably be heavily dependent upon contributions, 
this type of organization will be too risky. 
Alternative (2), the association, as an unincorporated body, can 
be formed by uniting two or more persons for purposes of performing 
certain activities. The unincorporated association, however, has 
many disadvantages and few advantages. The major disadvantages 
follow: 
(1) an association is not, under state law, a legal entity separate from 
the persons who control it; yet, if convenient for the IRS, it is treated 
as a corporation;l. 
(2) the laws governing such groups are generally few, vague, and inade-
13 See Associated Hospital Serv., Inc. v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 447, 465, 109 N.W.2d 271, 
280 (1961) for the test of whether or not dividends or other pecuniary benefits are contem-
plated to be paid to its members. 
II Miami Retreat Fd. v. Ervin, 62 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1952); Duncan v. Steeper, 17 Wis. 2d 
226, 116 N.W.2d 154 (1962). See generally E. FISCH, supra note 7, at § 394. 
" In Carolyn Trippe, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 622 (1950), a group providing hospitality to service-
men on furlough did not qualify as an organized charity within the meaning of the Code, even 
though it was a worthy and beneficient operation. See also Robert M. Hewitt, 16 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 468 (1957), where an unorganized mission conducted at home by a minister and his 
wife was held not to be a qualified donee. 
" The term "corporation" is defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) as including "associations, joint-
stock companies, and insurance companies." Thus, a corporation for tax purposes is not 
limited to those organizations which have been categorized as such under state law. 
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quate to spell out a system of organization and operation; 
(3) there mayl7 or may notl8 be freedom from personal liability for the 
acts of co-members, depending on the jurisdiction; and 
(4) generally an association can sue or be sued only in a representative 
capacity,19 unless a specific state statute permits the association to carry 
on litigation as an entity.20 
Of particular importance to the hypothetical environmental asso-
ciation is the possibility that, under the vicarious liability doctrine, 
negligence may be imputed from one member of the association to 
another.21 If liability can be imputed in tort, even for injury result-
ing from activities unrelated to the groups' objectives, involvement 
by prospective members will be discouraged. It is immaterial that 
the fear of personal liability might be speculative or unfounded; 
the result will be the same. Therefore, before the association 
form is chosen, counsel must look to local statutes and case law 
and distinguish the characteristics between corporations and asso-
ciations in civil suits. If the law of the jurisdiction imputes liability 
from one member of an association to another, counsel should be 
especially careful to caution the client against utilizing this organi-
zational method. In addition, particular attention must be given to 
such problem areas as res judicata, collateral estoppel, joinder of 
parties, class actions, and general statutory authorization permit-
ting an association to sue or be sued as an entity. For all of the 
17 In Wilcox v. Arnold, 162 Mass. 577, 39 N.E. 414 (1895), members of a college alumni 
group were held jointly liable for the costs of a yearbook because they had chosen one member 
to publish it. 
I. In Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. App. 217, 102 S.W.2d 738 (1937), a member of a trade 
association was held to be not liable for the salary of the editor of the association's journal 
because the member was inactive. 
I. Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 229 U.E.R.M.W., 188 A.2d 499 (Conn. 1963), held that a 
statute allowing a voluntary, unincorporated association to sue or be sued in its distinguishing 
name is procedural and creates no substantive right, and that resort must be had to extra-
neous circumstances to determine in a given case whether a right of action against the 
association exists on behalf of one of its members. But see Miazga v. International Union of 
Operating Eng'rs, 2 Ohio App. 2d 153, 196 N.E. 2d 324 (1964) (unincorporated association 
held legally responsible for injuries inflicted by wrongful acts not only to the public but to 
its members as well). 
20 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:64 (West) (1952); N.Y. Cw. PRAC. LAW (McKinney) § 1025 
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 182 (West) (1960); FLA. STAT. § 617.021(2) (1975). 
21 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 72; DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 
(1950) (the joinder of persons in furtherance of a common enterprise creates a mutual rela-
tionship of agency such that the negligence of anyone of the persons is imputed to each and 
all of them). Contra, Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948) (no action 
allowed against individual members on the basis of a first judgment against an association 
where the association's assets were insufficient to satisfy the judgment). 
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previously discussed reasons, it is suggested that the association 
route is a precarious one. 
Alternative (3), the corporation, is the best and most popular 
group enterprise of the alternatives listed. The major advantages 
follow: 
(1) a corporation avoids the major disadvantages of the association yet 
maintains the major benefits (i.e., fund raising capability, favorable tax 
status, etc.); 
(2) a corporation is an artificial entity-a legal entity ordinarily con-
sisting of a number of individuals but considered by the law as a body 
distinct from its component members thus giving limited liability; and 
(3) a corporation generally has a specific name or title and enjoys 
specified powers which are granted by state law. 
Since the corporation is a creature of state law, counsel must refer 
to the statutes that will govern in the particular jurisdiction. 
In general, non-profit corporations are treated in a manner exem-
plified by New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law22 which div-
ides non-profit corporations into four types.23 In a few states there 
are still no specially designated provisions for non-profit corpora-
tions, and only fragments of legislation can be found. Other states 
such as California,24 Delaware,25 Florida,28 Illinois,27 Louisiana,28 and 
Missouri,29 have made some significant changes in the statutory 
mechanisms applicable to non-profit corporations. 
C. Drafting the Articles of Incorporation 
Corporation status is a grant or license providing certain privi-
leges to perform certain activities. To perform its activities, a corpo-
22 N.Y. NOT· FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney) (1970). 
23 [d. § 201(b). 
Type A -includes civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, and 
similar corporations which are primarily for members' purposes and benefits. 
Type B-in,cludes charitable, educational, cultural, prevention of cruelty and like corpora-
tions which are primarily for non-business purposes. 
Type C-for any lawful business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objec-
tive. 
Type D-where formation is authorized by any other corporate law of this state for any 
business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary purpose or purposes specified by 
such other law . 
.. CAL. NON-PROFIT CORP. CODE § 9000 (West) (1977). 
,. DEL. CODE tit. 8, passim (1974). 
" FLA. STAT. § 617.01 et seq. (1975). 
"tT ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 (Smith-Hurd) (1970). 
" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-69 (West) (1969). 
" Mo. ANN. STAT. § 355 et seq. (Vernon) (1966). 
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ration must pay the incorporation fees required by the state and 
must comply with the state's licensing requirements. Both fee 
amounts and licensing requirements differ from state to state. 
The crucial factor in the organization's formation process is the 
attorney's responsibility. If desired by the client, the articles of 
incorporation and by-laws can be drafted in such a manner that it 
will be difficult for the original intent or objectives of the organizers 
to be discarded by a future (and possibly more numerous) member-
ship. Particular care and attention must be devoted to the drafting 
of the purpose clause, the provisions for excluding and expelling 
members, and the provisions relating to amendment of the articles 
and by-laws. Since the articles of incorporation or their equivalent 
are considered to have greater dignity than the by-laws, those activ-
ities and objectives which are deemed to be paramount to the organ-
ization's existence should be carefully protected by their specific 
inclusion in the articles. 
The "purpose clause" is of greatest importance. In effect, it de~ 
fines both the scope of the organization's non-profit objectives and 
its reasons for existence. It can be a general purpose clause, such as 
"To engage in charitable endeavors for the public good," or it can 
be more detailed.30 It is to be remembered, however, that the organi-
zation must serve a public rather than a private purpose if it is to 
qualify under the tax laws for exempt status. Counsel, therefore, 
would be prudent to define broadly the purpose of the organization 
and membership. 
Although non-profit corporations generally need no "powers 
clause" in their charter, it might be prudent to include an all pur-
pose powers clause following the purpose clause. For example, "To 
do everything and anything reasonably and lawfully necessary, pro-
per, suitable, or convenient for the achievement of the purpose(s) 
above stated, or for any of them, or for the furtherance of said 
purpose(s)." Inclusion of such a provision would clearly establish 
the power of the corporation to engage in virtually any activity 
,. For example, 
The corporation's sole purpose shall be to conserve, preserve, and otherwise prevent the 
waste, degradation and elimination of the scenic, aesthetic and historical values of 
[objective), by publishing general information regarding the above values, by providing 
directions, assistance and advice to all persons, organizations or governmental agencies 
with respect to the existence and importance of the above values, and, if necessary, to 
engage in litigation in the appropriate forum for protection and preservation of the above 
enumerated values. 
See Section III B(l), infra, for tax implications when drafting the articles of incorporation. 
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which would further the corporate purpose. 
To ensure that the corporation's original purpose clause is not 
amended by a future controlling membership, a provision should be 
included in the articles which affords some protection to the original 
objectives. For example, "The Articles of Incorporation may be 
amended, as provided for in the By-laws, except that the 'purpose 
clause' may only be amended by a unanimous vote of the Board of 
Directors and a 2/3 majority of all current regular members. The 
corporation's existence shall be null and void if this provision is 
amended or violated." 
If the organization is to pursue its purposes in an aggressive fash-
ion, a membership that is committed to the original objectives must 
always be maintained. The corporation should have the ability to 
expel and exclude members who have contrary objectives or con-
flicts of interests which would impede promotion of the original 
objectives. Several states have statutes which govern expulsion 
or exclusion of members.3! Associational interests are established 
and measured largely by the charter and by-laws. One who joins an 
organization agrees, at least impliedly, that the charter or by-laws 
shall determine his rights and status in relation to the organization 
and his fellow members.32 Courts can and do review the propriety 
of expulsions.33 They will do so especially when economic interests 
of members are involved,34 or when constitutional rights of a mem-
ber are affected.35 Expulsion of existing members is basically a civil 
31 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.13(c) (Baldwin) (1971). 
Membership in a corporation may be terminated in the manner provided by law, the 
articles, or the regulations (by·laws), and upon the termination of membership for any 
cause, such fact and the date of termination shall be recorded in the membership book. 
32 Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y.S. 1 (1919). While the constitution and by-
laws of a voluntary association constitute the sole rule which governs the relations between 
the association and its members, and courts will not redress any action in expelling or 
suspending a member taken in accordance therewith, such proceedings must be conducted 
in good faith, upon notice to the accused, and with an opportunity to be heard; otherwise, a 
court of equity will reverse the action of the aBBOciation and restore him to membership. ld. 
at 553, 179 N.Y.S. at 2. 
33 See, e.g., Randolf v. First Baptist Church, 120 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Common Pleas 1954) 
(church could not expel a member with entire disregard of its unequivocal constitutional 
provisions governing expulsion from membership). 
34 When membership in an organization is an economic necessity, there is a need for truly 
protecting public welfare and advancing interests of justice by safeguarding the individual's 
opportunity for earning a livelihood while not impairing the rights of the organization. See 
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) . 
.. De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 139, 187 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 333 
U.S. 876 (1947) (membership in a trade union is a "property right" within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment). However, except when economic interests are involved, it has consis-
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rights (constitutional) problem,38 and right of association has been 
accorded constitutional dimensions by the courts. 37 The judicially 
created protections with regard to this right of association were 
essentially codified in the Federal Civil Rights Law of 1964.38 
In sum, to safeguard the corporation's interest, counsel should 
draft charter and by-law provisions relating to expulsion or exclu-
sion of members very precisely. For expulsion, notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard always must be given; otherwise, an expulsion 
may be ruled invalid by a court.39 
III. TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
Environmental litigation, unlike many other types of litigation, 
often poses a situation where opposing interests are enormously une-
qual in their economic resources. Environmentally conscious groups 
and individuals are often unaware of the enormous costs of pro-
tracted litigation and engage in lawsuits without sufficient funding. 
The obvious result of this situation is the need for an organizational 
structure to supply the necessary financial backing. It is the conten-
tion of this article that such structure may be available under the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code) in the form of the tax-exempt corpo-
ration, and that contributions to this organization may be deducti-
ble by donors on their individual tax returns. 
This section of the article provides an overview of two tax provi-
sions-sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2)-which allow for such an 
organization. The prior makes the organization tax-exempt and the 
latter makes the contributions deductible. 
tently been held that a non-profit organization could not be forced to accept an applicant as 
a member. See, e.g., Barazani v. Brighton & Manhattan Beach Chamber of Commerce Civil 
Ass'n, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 844, 194 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1959). 
'" For an excellent summary of the aspects concerning expulsion of members, see Palsey, 
Exculsion and ExpUlsion from Non-Profit Organizations-The Civil Rights Aspect, 14 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 203 (1965); Friedem, Judicial Review of Expulsion Actions in Voluntary 
Associations, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 160 (1966). 
37 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947), for example, held that a member's 
relation to the association is the true subject matter of protection by judicial interference. 
See also Nyman v. Dessert Club, 109 Cal. App. 2d 63, 240 P.2d 37 (1952) (preliminary 
injunction by lower court restraining defendant club from interfering with plaintiff member's 
full use and enjoyment of club facility pending determination of whether expulsion was lawful 
was held not to be an abuse of discretion by the trial court). 
,. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970). 
39 For example, in Briggs v. Technocracy, 85 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1948), expulsion of 
member from membership corporation without prior notice, statement of charge, or oppor-
tunity to be heard was held illegal, though by-laws of corporations made no express provision 
for a hearing. See text at note 32, supra. 
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A. The Tax-Exempt Organization-§ 501(c)(3) 
Section 501(c) lists those organizations deemed to fall within the 
tax-exempt category. Among the organizations listed are fraternal 
orders,40 credit unions without capital stock, U teacher retirement 
plans:2 chambers of commerce:3 labor organizations:4 and others. 
However, for purposes of providing a structure from which to fi-
nance environmental litigation, the most important is § 501(c)(3) 
and, to a lesser degree, § 501(c)(4). 
Section 501(c)(3) makes exempt: 
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing 
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national 
or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation ... and 
which does not participate in or intervene in (including the publishing 
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any 
candidate for public office.45 
Section 501(c)(4) exempts: 
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of 
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net 
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or 
recreational purposes. 48 
A distinction of major importance between the above two Code 
sections is that a § 501(c)(4) organization does not qualify as a § 
170(c)(2) donee:7 while a § 501(c)(3) organization does. Also, quali-
fying as a § 501(c)(3) organization will not only spare the corpora-
tion the burden of paying federal income tax, but may also involve 
OJ I.R.C. § 501(c)(8) . 
.. [d. § 501(c)(14) . 
.. [d. § 501(c)(1l). 
" [d. § 501(c)(6). 
II [d. § 501(c)(5) . 
.. [d. § 501(c)(3) . 
.. [d. § 501(c)(4). 
" For a detailed discussion of section 170(c)(2), see Section III D, infra. 
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exemption from certain federal excise and employment taxes as well 
as exemption from certain state and local sales, use, property,48 and 
other taxes. 
B. Qualifying as a § 501(c)(3) Organization 
As the text of § 501(c)(3) indicates, an organization will qualify 
for exempt status if the following four criteria are met: (1) no part 
of the organization's net earnings goes to benefit private interests; 
(2) the organization does not engage in certain political activities; 
(3) the organization is organized and operated exclusively for any 
one or more of the purposes listed in § 501(c)(3) (our hypothetical 
organization would have a "charitable" purpose); and (4) the organ-
ization serves a public rather than a private interest. Section 
1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the Treasury Regulations provides that in 
order to be exempt as an organization under § 501(c)(3), an organi-
zation must be both organized and operated within certain guide-
lines established by both organizational and operational tests. 
1. Organizational Test 
The organizational test is met only if the articles of incorporation 
or their written equivalent·· limit the corporate purpose to one or 
more exempt purposes50 and do not expressly empower the corpora-
tion to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activi-
ties, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one 
or more exempt purposes.51 In meeting the organizational test, the 
organization's purpose may either be as broad as, or more specific 
than, the purposes cited in § 501(c)(3). For example, an organiza-
tion which has as its purpose the furtherance of literary and scien-
tific purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) will, if it meets the 
other requirements of the organizational test, be considered to have 
met the test. 52 
In no case will an organization be considered to be organized 
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if, by the terms of its 
articles, the purposes for which such organization is created are 
broader than the purposes specified in § 501(c)(3).53 An organization 
IS See note 7. supra . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2)(1959). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1959). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(1959). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(ii)(1959). 
53 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv)(1959). 
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is not considered organized exclusively for one or more exempt pur-
poses if its articles or the instrument by which it is created expressly 
empower the corporation to: 
(a) devote more than an insubstantial part of its activities to 
attempts at influencing legislation by propaganda, or otherwise;54 
(b) directly or indirectly participate in or intervene in any polit-
ical campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any ca:ndidate for 
public office;55 or 
(c) have objectives and to engage in activities which character-
ize it as an "action organization."58 
In addition, an organization is not organized for one or more exempt 
purposes if its assets are not dedicated to an exempt purpose. An 
organization's assets will be considered dedicated to an exempt pur-
pose if, upon dissolution, such assets would by reason of a provision 
in the organization's articles or by operation of law, be distributed 
for one or more exempt purposes, or to the federal government, or 
to a state or local government for a public purposeY Distribution 
of a corporation's assets to its members or shareholders upon disso-
lution by authority of its articles will not enable the corporation to 
meet the organizational test. 
In spite of the best intentions of the corporate members to pursue 
their objectives in an acceptable manner, the IRS will suggest as a 
matter of procedure the inclusion into the articles the following 
prOVISIOn: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of these articles, this corporation 
shall not carryon any other activities not permitted to be carried on by 
(a) a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or the corresponding 
provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law) or (b) by 
a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under section 
170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or the corresponding 
provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law).58 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3)(i)(1959). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3)(ii)(1959). The publication or distribution of statements 
is considered participation or intervention in a political campaign for the purposes of § 
501(c)(3). [d. 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(iii)(1959). For further discussion of an action organiza-
tion. see Section III B(2). infra. 
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(4)(1959). 
"" How to Apply for Recognition of Exemption for an Organization. I.R.S. Publication 557. 
§ 2 at 8 (1977 ed.). 
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In sum, there are many barriers to exempt status, but the organiza-
tional test is one of the easiest to pass. Prudence, therefore, dictates 
compliance with the procedural requirements outlined above. 
2. Operational Test 
As indicated previously, in addition to the organizational test 
there is an operational test to be met. Under this requirement, all 
but an insubstantial part of the organization's activities must be 
devoted to its tax exempt purposes. Unfortunately, virtually no au-
thoritative guidelines have been promulgated concerning the cir-
cumstances under which a proscribed activity constitutes a 
"substantial" part of the organization's activities. The Treasury 
Regulations provide no guidance, and the IRS rulings are silent. 
Case law does provide somewhat more insight; however, it too fails 
in the development of a tangible test. Rather the cases seem to 
espouse an intuitive determination as to whether the proscribed 
activities were "substantial" or "insubstantial," as found on a case-
by-case basis. Some of the factors used in making this finding are 
receipts and expenditures incidental to the activity, the time alloted 
to the activity, and the significance attached to the activity by the 
organization itself. 
With respect to the operational test, a corporation is regarded as 
qualifying under § 501(c)(3) if it is operated exclusively for one or 
more exempt purpose by virtue of its primarily engaging in activi-
ties which accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes.59 The 
following factual situations disqualify a corporation under § 
501(c)(3): 
(a) An organization whose net earnings inure in whole or in part 
to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.so 
(b) An organization which, by virtue of its activities, can be 
classified as an action organization.81 
"Action" organizations are defined as those organizations which (1) 
attempt to influence legislation by their own contacts, (2) urge the 
public to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of 
proposing, supporting or opposing legislation,82 or (3) advocate the 
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)(1959) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)(1959). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i)(1959) . 
., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)(1959). 
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adoption or rejection of legislation.83 In addition, an organization 
might be deemed an action organization if it participates in a politi-
cal campaign, either directly or indirectly. 84 Finally, an organization 
will fall within the ambit of the action organization definition if its 
main objective can only be attained or defeated by legislation, or if 
it campaigns for this main objective which requires legislative ac-
tion.85 
As far as the client's general purposes are concerned, however, the 
corporation could strengthen its posture for meeting the § 501(c)(3) 
operational test by not engaging solely in litigation, unless it wishes 
to conduct its activities as a public interest law firm.aa The corpora-
tion could reasonably participate in activities which provide the 
public with information concerning the significance of the environ-
mental values it seeks to protect. An organization is not precluded 
from qualifying under § 501(c)(3) just because in carrying out its 
primary purpose it advocates social or civic changes or presents 
opinions on controversial issues with the intention of molding public 
opinion or creating public sentiment, as long as it is not considered 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii)(b)(1959) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii)(1959) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv)(1969). In League of Women Voters v. United States, 
180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960), the League was held not to 
qualify for an estate tax deduction for failure to comply with the statutory condition providing 
that "no substantial part of the activities ... [of the organization shall bel carrying on 
propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." In effect, this holding denied 
the League the benefit of § 501 (c)(3) status. The court of claim's finding was based on facts 
which showed that the League's main purpose was to influence legislation. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 501(h), 504, 4911 (1976), provided some new 
guidelines with regard to lobbying restrictions. For an in-depth discussion of the recent 
changes in the lobbying restrictions, see Weithorn, Practitioners' Planning Guide to the New 
Lobbying Rules for Public Charities, 46 J. TAX 294 (1977); Internal Revenue Service Notice 
451, Lobbying of Eligible Public Charities (May, 1977); Dressner & McLean, Tax Reform Act: 
Public Charities, Lobbying, II ART & THE LAW, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 1, col. 3 . 
.. The public interest law firm is a recent addition to the list of types of organizations 
considered charitable. The public interest law firm does not necessarily represent the poor 
segment of society such as those represented by the legal aid programs. These firms supply 
legal representation for key citizen interests which would otherwise go unrepresented due to 
their economically unfeasible nature. Environmental policy is one type of interest in which 
the public generally wishes to have some voice but often cannot afford the costs involved in 
securing legal representation to promote environmental interests. For background informa-
tion, see Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575 (guidelines under which IRS will issue advance 
rules of exemption to public interest law firms); Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662 (procedures 
under which a public interest law firm may accept fees for its services). See also Rev. Rul. 
75-74 (when a public interest law firm qualifies under § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 75-76 (a public 
interest law firm which accepts only court awarded fees can qualify under § 501(c)(3)). A full 
discussion of the public interest law firm can be found at Section m C(l), infra. 
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an action organization.67 By formally establishing these environ-
mental interests, the corporation will not only improve its ability to 
meet the organizational test, but will also increase its capability to 
litigate against private or public action adversely affecting the envi-
ronmental values which the corporation sought to promote through 
its non-litigational activities. It may, in addition, obtain added ex-
posure and membership. 
Of course, if the organization is involved in "action" activities so 
as to preclude its tax-exempt qualification under § 501(c)(3), it 
might still qualify for tax exempt status under § 501(c)(4). In 
this case, however, the donees' benefit of deductibility is lost. 
Treasury Regulation § 1.501 (c)(4)-1(a) provides that an organi-
zation is eligible for § 501(c)(4) status if it is not for profit and is 
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. The Regu-
lations prohibit intervention in political campaigns;68 however, no 
mention is made as to influencing legislation. Thus, a civic league 
could be organized to advocate or oppose specific environmental 
legislation and still qualify as a tax exempt § 501(c)(4) organization, 
but individual donors would not be entitled to a charitable deduc-
tion on their individual tax returns. 
C. Qualifying for Exempt Status 
An organization does not become exempt merely by designating 
itself exempt; nor does it do so by requesting exempt status from 
the IRS and instantaneously getting approval. Rather, the request 
must be considered by the IRS.69 An organization which is trying to 
serve the public interest either solely or partially through litigation 
must meet the qualifications provided in the Revenue Procedures 
(Rev. Proc.).70 
1. Requirements to Establish a Public Interest Law Firm 
As indicated earlier, one option is to litigate through a public 
interest law firm structure which will qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organi-
zation. At this point, however, one becomes lost in the IRS maze. 
The rulings and procedures do not provide for a definition of a 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)(1959) . 
.. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii)(1959) . 
.. I.R.C. § 508(a). 
7. For excellent references as to the necessary procedures, see B. Boettcher, Exempt Organi-
zations-Exemption and Filing Requirements (BNA Tax Mgt. Portfolio #337, 1976); How to 
Apply for Recognition of Exemption for an Organization, supra note 58. 
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"public interest law firm," although the image is that of an associa-
tion of attorneys working on public interest cases. As will be seen,71 
the IRS at times seems to regard the rubric "public interest law 
firm" as a more encompassing term. The rulings seem to say that a 
corporation controlled by attorneys and doing all types of public 
interest law, including environmental litigation, is qualified; a qual-
ified environmental organization getting involved in environmental 
litigation will lose its exemption; and an organization formed only 
for environmental litigation is questionable. 72 Suffice it to say that 
the authors are unable to determine if, and if so how, the IRS distin-
guishes between a public interest law firm and a charitable organi-
zation which wishes to get involved in litigation. Thus, great caution 
is advised and close contact with the IRS is needed. Nevertheless, 
if one wishes to form a public interest law firm (whatever that is), 
certain guidelines are provided. 
Rev. Proc. 71-3973 provides guidelines under which an advance 
exemption letter can be issued. In order to receive this advance 
letter the prospective firm must establish that the litigation which 
it will undertake is aimed at matters of public concern and interest. 
The Rev. Proc. notes that such interest will not be found in private 
suits against a private party if the party represented can provide his 
own counsel. 
Supplementing Rev. Proc. 71-39 is Rev. Proc. 75-1374 which estab-
lishes how the firm seeking exemption status can accept fees for its 
services. Basically, the organization can accept attorney's fees in a 
public interest case if the fees are paid by the opposing parties and 
awarded by the court. The organization's attorneys, however, must 
be payed on a salary basis. 
A number of Revenue Rulings (Rev. Rul.) provide additional 
guidance for the envisioned § 501(c)(3) public interest law firm. 
Rev. Rul. 75-7475 directs firms which wish to be deemed tax-exempt 
under § 501(c)(3) to file an application (Form 1023) with the IRS 
District Director for the district in which the firm will have its 
principal place of business or principal offices. In addition, Rev. 
Rul. 75-74 states that it is essential that the litigation be a public 
interest case which would not be financially worthwhile to a private 
attorney. 
71 See Section III (E), infra. 
72 [d. 
73 1971-2 C.B. 575. 
74 1975-1 C.B. 662. 
7' 1975-1 C.B. 152. 
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Rev. Rul. 75-7576 provides that a public interest law firm will not 
qualify if it accepts fees from its clients. However, this ruling is 
supplemented by Rev. Rul. 75-76,77 which states that awarded attor-
ney's fees can be accepted by the organization without jeopardizing 
its exempt status, provided it does not pick and choose its cases on 
the basis of the likelihood of receiving attorney's fees. 
2. Other Requirements 
Regardless of whether the proposed organization is to be a public 
interest law firm or a more general environmental organization, 
certain other procedures must be followed. Of foremost import to 
the practicioner, the organization must file for exemption within 15 
months of its date of organization (i.e., date of incorporation or 
association}.78 A determination letter may be obtained prior to the 
date of organization, but only if the proposed operations can be 
described in sufficient detail,79 The organization must be able to 
describe fully the activities in which it expects to engage, how it 
plans to carry out those activities, the anticipated source of income, 
and its contemplated expenditures. 
The exemption must be applied for on IRS Form 1023. This appli-
cation will show the character of the organization, the purpose for 
which it is organized, its actual activities, the sources of income and 
receipts, the disposition of income and receipts, whether or not any 
of the income or receipts is credited to surplus or may inure to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and in general, all 
facts relating to operations which may affect the organization's right 
to exemption. Also, the following items must be attached to the 
application: a copy of the articles of incorporation or a similar in-
strument which shows the permitted powers and activities of the 
organization; a copy of the by-laws; and the most recent financial 
statement reporting the assets, liabilities, receipts, and disburse-
ments of the organization. Based on all this information, the IRS 
will determine whether or not the organization qualifies for tax-
exempt status. 
" [d. at 154. 
77 [d. 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.508-l(a)(2)(i)(1972). 
19 Rev. Proc. 72-4, 1972-1 C.B. 706. 
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D. Obtaining the Charitable Contribution-§ 170 
Obtaining the tax-exempt status of § 501(c) is only one-half of an 
environmental organization's two-pronged goal. The group should 
also seek approval as a charitable contribution donee under § 170. 
Section 170(c)(2) provides that a contribution to a corporation, 
trust, community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, and which does not have net earnings inuring to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and which does not 
spend a substantial part of its activity time in carrying on propa-
ganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation or intervene 
in political campaigns, will be deductible. It should be obvious to 
the reader that these restrictions mirror the restrictions of § 
501(c)(3). 
Section 170(b)(1)(A) gives the general guidelines as to what types 
of organizations are eligible to qualify for tax deductiblecontribu-
tions. The pertinent portion of that provision covers organizations 
fitting the following description: 
An organization [which is a proper charitable organization] which nor-
mally receives a substantial part of its support (exclusive of income 
received in the exercise or performance by such organization of its chari-
table, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis 
for its exemption. . .) from a governmental unit. . . or from direct or 
indirect contributions from the general public.so 
Thus it can be seen that there are two basic requirements. First, the 
organization must be a properly established charitable organization 
as defined in § 170(c)(2). Second, it must be a publicly supported 
organization. 
1. Public Support Test 
Obviously, the next line of inquiry is to establish what is meant 
by a "publicly supported organization." Treasury Regulation § 
1.170A-9(e)(1)(ii) offers some assistance by stating that an organiza-
tion will be treated as a publicly supported organization if it meets 
either of two tests. One test requires that at least 33 V3 percent of 
the organization's total support which is normally received come 
from government or the general public.81 lfthe organization fails this 
.. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) . 
• , Treas. Reg. § 1.l70A·9(e)(2)(1972). 
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test, however, it can still be considered publicly supported if it 
passes a factual determination test. This test requires that at least 
10 percent of the organization's normal support corne from govern-
mental units, from contributions made directly or indirectly by the 
general public, or from a combination of these sources.82 Under this 
alternative test, the organization must also prove that it is organ-
ized and operated so as to attract new and additional public or 
governmental support on a continuous basis.83 This requirement will 
be deemed to have been met if the organization maintains a contin-
uous and bona fide program for solicitation of funds from the gen-
eral public, community, or membership group involved, or if it car-
ries on activities designed to attract support.84 Besides the factual 
determination test, the IRS looks subjectively at other factors such 
as: (1) support in excess of 10 percent from the general public;85 (2) 
support from a representative number of persons;86 (3) a governing 
body which represents the broad interests of the public;87 (4) contin-
uous provision of facilities or services that directly benefit the gen-
eral public;88 and (5) additional factors such as how dues are solic-
ited,89 dues rates,90 and the likelihood that an organization's activi-
ties will appeal to a broad common interest.9\ 
The Regulations state that consideration will be given to the fact 
that an organization may, in its early years of existence, limit the 
scope of its solicitation to persons deemed most likely to provide 
seed money in an amount sufficient to enable the organization to 
commence its charitable activities and expand its solicitation pro-
gram.92 
A major difficulty which arises in meeting either the 33 1/3 percent 
public support test or the 10 percent public support minimum 
under the factual determination test is that single individual contri-
butions may apply as "public" support only to the extent of 2 per-
cent of the total contributions received by the organization.93 But 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(1972). 
K3 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(ii)(1972). 
" [d . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(iii)(1972). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(iv)(1972) . 
., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(v)(1972) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(vi)(1972) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(vii)(a)(1972) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(vii)(b)(1972). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(vii)(c)(1972). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(ii)(1972). 
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i)(1972). 
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the total contribution will still be used as the denominator in com-
puting total support. For example, if a hypothetical organization 
receives $100,000 from a nonpublic source and $100,000 each from 
two individuals, its total support will be $300,000. However, only 2 
percent of $300,000, or $6,000 can be counted from anyone individ-
ual. Thus, in our hypothetical, the organization's percentage of pub-
lic support would be $12,000 divided by $300,000 or 4 percent. The 
organization would fail to qualify under either test. 
The harshness of this rule is mitigated to some extent by a provi-
sion that one or more contributions which might normally fall 
within the 2 percent limitation may be excluded for purposes of 
satisfying the support test.D4 Although "all pertinent facts and cir-
cumstances will be taken into consideration"u5 to determine if the 
exclusion applies, three minimum requirements must be met to 
avoid the 2 percent limitation. First, the contribution must have 
been received from disinterested parties whose contributions were 
attracted by reason of the publicly supported nature of the organiza-
tion.Uft Second, these contributions must have been unusual or unex-
pected with respect to amount.U7 Finally, the contributions must, by 
reason of their size, adversely affect the status of the organization 
as normally being publicly supported.98 
In sum, the organizers should seek as broad a base as possible for 
their financial support and should key the solicitation program to 
the criteria just discussed. 
2. Obtaining an Advance Ruling 
Qualification as a § 170 charitable donee requires careful prepara-
tion. The attorney should consult Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
9(e)(5) for the specific requirements for obtaining an advance ruling 
or determination letter which will sanction the deductibility of con-
tributions by donors to the charitable organization. This is a key 
item, because no matter how laudible the charitable interest of the 
donor, the tax deductibility of the contribution will usually be an 
overriding factor in the initial donation decision. 
As a general rule, an organization must have had a tax year con-
sisting of at least eight months before the IRS will issue a ruling or 
II Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(ii)(1972) . 
.. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(iii)(1972). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(ii)(a)(1972). 
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(ii)(b)(1972) . 
•• Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(ii)(c)(1972). 
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determination letter concerning the § 170 requirements. DD A newly 
created organization, however, can seek to obtain an advance ruling 
that it will be considered a tax deductible charity for its first two 
taxable years. IOO Such an advance ruling can be issued if it can be 
reasonably expected that the organization will pass the 33 V3 per-
cent public support test or the factual determination test. to! How-
ever, it should be noted that the issuing of this ruling is entirely 
discretionary with the IRS.102 
Once a favorable ruling has been obtained, the organization must 
remain vigilant in carrying out its objectives to ensure that it does 
not lose its charitable donee status. For example, the IRS took un-
precedented action contrary to its normal proceduresl03 when it 
found that although the Sierra Club was named in the Cumulative 
List of Organizations eligible to receive deductible contributions, 
the IRS was no longer prepared to extend advance assurances of de-
ductibility of contributions to the group.104 The IRS contended 
that the Sierra Club may have violated the prohibition against 
activities designed to influence legislation by taking out a full page 
advertisement in various newspapers in Washington, D.C., and 
New York on June 9, 1966. The newspaper advertisement urged 
readers to protest a bill then under consideration in the Congress 
relating to the damming of the Colorado River .105 
E. Fitting "Environmental Litigation" within the Definition of 
"Charity" 
An underlying assumption of this article has been that an organi-
zation which is formed primarily for environmental litigation pur-
poses will fall within the definitions of §§ 501 (c)(3) and 170. Cer-
tainly this is not an impossibility since the IRS recognizes public 
interest litigation firms as a permissible activity. 106 
The argument that an organization formed to fund litigation can 
II Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(4)(vi)(1972). 
,00 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(5)(i)(1972). 
'0' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(5)(ii)(1972). 
'0' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(5)(i)(1972). 
'03 See Rev. Proc. 64-65. 
, .. [19671 6 Fed. Taxes (P-H) ~ 54,664. 
'05 See Rev. Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 C.B. 818, for the procedural mechanisms by which the IRS 
can withdraw the advance assurance of deductibility to an organization. See also Founding 
Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
1009 (1970). 
, .. See discussion Section ill C(1), supra. 
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qualify under § 501(c)(3) can be supported by an analogous situa-
tion found in Rev. Rul. 73-285.107 In that situation a religious sect's 
tenets required them not to act in a certain manner. The result was 
that they were in violation of state law. In addition, the tenets of 
the religion prohibited members from defending themselves in 
court. To overcome this hurdle an organization was formed, the sole 
activity of which was to provide funds for the defense of sect mem-
bers. None of the sect members belonged to the organization. The 
IRS found that this organization, created solely to fund litigation 
costs through public donations, was exempted under § 501(c)(3). 
Conceptually, the Code treats the term charitable in a broad, 
multifaceted manner. The concept of charitable includes: (1) relief 
of poverty by assisting the poor, the distressed, and the underprivi-
leged; (2) advancement of religion; (3) advancement of education 
and science; (4) advancement of governmental functions and lessen-
ing the burdens of government; (5) promotion of health; and (6) 
promotion of social welfare for the benefit of the community.108 
The problem is complicated by the fact that no clear extrajudicial 
definition of "charity" is available. The IRS merely says that the 
term is to be used in its generally accepted legal sense. IOD Further, 
the term is not limited to the enumerated purposes or guidelines 
listed in the Regulations. The courts generally determine what does 
or does not constitute a charitable purpose without articulating ex-
plicit standards. However, a long-standing judicial precedent exists 
for a broad interpretation of the concept of charity. In Quid v. 
Washington Hospital for Foundlings,11O the Supreme Court stated 
that "[a] charitable use, where neither law nor public policy for-
bids, may be applied to most anything that tends to promote the 
well doing and well being of social man."111 
The environmental corporation could be characterized under sev-
eral of the articulated categories. Protection of environmental and 
aesthetic values through litigation or other permissible means al-
lowable to a § 501(c)(3) organization arguably lessens the govern-
ment's burden, particularly in view of federal, 112 state,113 and local114 
,.7 1973-2 C.B. 174. 
10K IRC. § 501(c); Treas. Reg. §§ l.501(c)(3)-l.501(d)(2)(1959). 
10' Treas. Reg. §§ l.501(c)(3)-l.501(d)(2)(1959). 
II. 95 U.S. 303 (1877). 
"' [d. at 31l. 
112 E.g., Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II 
1972); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). 
II3 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 403 (1975). 
,,, E.g., METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY CODE, ch. 24. 
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legislation mandating governmental protection of the environment. 
Some organizations within this concept of "charitable" provide 
services in the context of governmental activity such as assisting in 
the preservation of a public lake,115 beautifying a city, 118 engaging in 
solid waste recycling,1I7 community improvements,1I8 community 
land analysis,1I8 and provision of a public park. l20 
The Regulations define a charitable entity as one which, among 
other things, lessens the burdens of government, promotes social 
welfare, defends human rights, etc. 121 The fact that an organization 
in carrying out its primary purpose advocates changes or presents 
opinions on controversial issues with the intention of molding public 
opinion or creating public sentiment for the acceptance of its views 
does not preclude the organization from qualifying under § 
501(c)(3). The concept of "charitable" certainly encompasses the 
promotion of a clean and healthful environment. 
The viability of this argument is further supported by Rev. Proc. 
71-39, which sets forth guidelines for public interest law firms. Spe-
cifically, a public interest law firm will qualify for a § 501(c)(3) 
exemption if it engages in litigation on behalf of the public at large 
on matters of public interest: 
The representation may be either in some specific area of public con-
cern, such as protection of the environment, or more broadly upon any 
subject of public interest as determined by the applicant. . . . Typical 
of such litigation may be class actions in the public interest, suits for 
injunction against action by government or private interest broadly af-
fecting the public, similar representation before administrative boards 
and agencies, test suits where the private interest is small, and the like. 
The activity would not normally extend to direct representation of liti-
gants in actions between private persons where their financial interests 
at stake would warrant representation from private legal sources. In 
... Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129. 
\11 Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243. 
117 Rev. Rul. 71-29, 1971-1 C.B. 150. 
"0 Rev. Rul. 68-15, 1968-1 C.B. 244 . 
... Rev. Rul. 67-391, 1967-2 C.B. 190 . 
• 20 Rev. Rul. 66-358, 1966-2 C.B. 218. Organizations which have achieved § 501(c)(3) status 
and the benefits that flow therefrom are listed in IRS Publication No. 78, Cumulative List 
of Organizations as Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A few 
examples of listed organizations which have environmental or aesthetic goals as their purpose 
are the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc., the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the Friends of Earth Foundation, Inc., and the Histor-
ical Association of Southern Florida, Inc. 
12. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1.50l(d). 
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such cases, however, the organization may serve in the nature of a friend 
of the court.122 
Finally, if one examines Schedule F of Form 1023 (Application for 
Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501 (c)(3)), it refers to pub-
lic interest law firms "and similar organizations. "123 The first ques-
tion on this Schedule is revealing by its language: "Will the organi-
zation conform to the guidelines for organizations engaged in 
litigation activities ... in Rev. Proc. 71-39 ... ?"124 While Rev. 
Proc. 71-39 refers only to public interest law firms, IRS Form 1023, 
Schedule F suggests that other types of organizations can engage in 
litigation and still qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organization. 
Thus, it would appear that both the Code and the Regulations 
provide that if one organizes an environmental group for the purpose 
of protecting and improving the environment through litigation and 
studiously avoids any attempts (within the guidelines provided) to 
promote or defeat any specific legislation125 there should be no prob-
lem in getting tax-exempt status. This is not, in fact, the case. 
Three IRS private letter rulings make it quite clear that any or-
ganization which intends to engage in environmental litigation will 
have a tough road to follow. A March 8, 1976 letter128 was issued to 
a group "organized for the purpose of stimulating public apprecia-
tion of the values of wildlife and preserving and protecting wildlife 
through sanctuaries."127 The IRS concluded that the organization 
was not qualified for an exemption under § 501(c)(3). The disquali-
fying action, inter alia, was a $700 contribution toward legal fees in 
a suit whose object was to require a federal highway agency to file 
an environmental impact statement regarding a proposed highway. 
It is suggested that the following logic of the IRS is contrary to the 
evidence as previously presented. 
It is by no means clear that protection and improvement of the environ-
ment is always a charitable purpose . 
• 22 Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, at §§ 2-3 (emphasis added). In the instant situation, 
the engagement of the organization in litigation can reasonably be said to be in representation 
of a broad public interest. The litigation is designed to present a position on behalf of the 
public at large on matters of public interest . 
• 23 I.R.S. Form 1023. 
'2' [d . 
• 25 Efforts to influence a regulatory agency rule should be distinguished from efforts to 
promote or defeat legislation for the purposes of qualifying as a tax exempt organization 
pursuant to §§ 501(c)(3} and (4) . 
... Application of Housatonic Audubon Society, Inc., Ref. No. E:EO:T:R:2-5 (Mar. 8, 
1976). 
127 [d. 
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Moreover, even if we assume that protection and improvement of the 
environment is a charitable purpose and that your contribution of 
money for the legal expenses in the ... litigation was motivated by a 
desire to protect or improve the environment, your contribution results 
in no direct improvement of the environment. In this case there is an 
improvement in the environment only if the litigation succeeds. Fur-
thermore, there is no immediate improvement of the environment even 
if the litigation succeeds, since the object of this litigation is to compel 
the government to file an environmental impact statement rather than 
to compel the government to take an action directly affecting the envi-
ronment, e.g., to compel the government to reroute the highway. 
Finally, even if we assume that the ... litigation will result in some 
improvement of the environment, it is still not clear that the overall 
effect of the litigation will be beneficial to the area. l28 
In the second letter ruling,129 the organization was requested to 
supply additional information. Following are some of the questions 
asked by IRS: 
5. Since you propose to institute litigation on your own behalf, how do 
you serve a charitable purpose by such representation? 
6. How do you justify your argument that the protection or improve-
ment of the environment is a charitable purpose? 
7. If you institute legal action which results in obtaining an injunction 
or other court order prohibiting or requiring action on the part of the 
defendant, what will the effect of this order have on the environment? 
8. If you institute legal action that is ultimately successful, and the 
consequences (such as lack of employment, loss of land from tax rolls, 
loss of water storage, etc.) are not clearly in the best interests of the 
community, then how is such litigation performing a charitable 
purpose? 
9. Will you enter into negotiation with business and other leaders to 
resolve environmental problems prior to institution of court action? 
10. If you institute legal action and you do not prevail, how will this 
directly benefit the environment? 
11. Are the consequences of your legal activities clearly predictable 
and obviously beneficial to the community affected?130 
Finally, an organization was created to provide support for envi-
ronmentallitigation in the form of financing, research, information, 
12. [d. 
121 Application of Environmental Action Institute, Inc., Ref. No. E:EO:T:R:l:3-WP (May 
17, 1977). 
130 [d. 
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and communications. Its principal activities were the payment of 
attorneys' fees and expenses for environmental suits and the con-
duct of environmental law seminars. In the letter ruling131 the IRS 
decided that the organization did not qualify for exempt status 
because environmental litigation did not have a direct and immedi-
ate effect on the environment, was not clearly in the public interest, 
and would not definitely result in community benefit. 
These rulings are difficult to reconcile with the apparent mandate 
provided by the Rev. Procs. on public interest law firms. It is the 
contention of the authors that these private rulings are wrong. Given 
the great need for environmental advocates in light of the now 
widely-accepted belief that protection of the environment is a pub-
lic concern, the IRS should not be hindering these efforts. Ample 
evidence exists to indicate that society as a whole, as well as the 
Congress and IRS policy, all view environmental protection as com-
ing within the ambit of § 501(c)(3). It appears, however, that the 
IRS takes this view only in the abstract. When actual cases have 
come before the agency, it has been unwilling to rule that an inten-
tion to engage in environmental litigation qualifies for tax exempt 
status. Obviously, there is a great need for clarification. What is the 
definition of a public interest law firm? Does it include a litigating 
organization? What about an organization which merely supports 
litigation through its financial resources? Why is there any question 
as to whether environmental protection is within the scope of § 
501(c)(3)? Can an organization which is qualified as a charity under 
§ 501(c)(3) involve itself in litigation without jeopardizing its ex-
emption, or is litigation to be limited to public interest law firm 
status? Can an organization qualify as a § 501(c)(3) charity if a 
primary purpose of its formation is to litigate? 
. The list of questions is endless and the confusion unbounded. The 
clear import of past public rulings by the IRS is that an organization 
can be formed for environmental litigation and still qualify as a § 
501(c)(3) charity. But the private rulings have portrayed a decid-
edly contrary position. 
The apparent rationale behind the IRS's restrictive policy is the 
notion that litigation is not an inherently charitable activity, and 
thus an organization whose purposes are otherwise charitable may 
not become involved in law suits without endangering its § 501(c)(3) 
131 Application of the Montana Wilderness Association Legal and Educational Fund, Inc., 
Ref. No. E:EO:T:R:I-2 (May 9, 1977). 
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status. The error in this position stems from an inability to differen-
tiate between an exempt organization's purposes, which may be 
charitable, and the means by which those purposes are sought. Any 
means, including litigation, should be permissible if in furtherance 
of the charitable goals and not otherwise unlawful or in contradic-
tion to other Code provisions. . 
Perhaps the best argument that can be found against the IRS's 
seemingly contradictory position in the private letter rulings can be 
found in Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz. 132 The 
Center case, an offshoot of Watergate, was concerned with whether 
political influence from the White House affected the IRS's denial 
of § 501(c)(3) status to the plaintiff organization. Of particular im-
portance is the court's discussion of whether the plaintiff's activities 
came within the confines of § 501(c)(3). Specifically, the plaintiff 
involved itself in litigation activities and helped support a sister 
organization in carrying on proxy contests. In finding that the plain-
tiff met the requirements of a public interest law firm, the court 
noted that the only requirement placed on the scope of litigation 
was that it be in some area of public concern or upon any subject 
of public interest as determined by the plaintiff. 133 The IRS claimed 
that the plaintiff was not qualified because it had financially sup-
ported its sister organization which was a non-charitable organiza-
tion engaged in proxy fights-a non-charitable activity. In striking 
down this argument, the court gave wide latitude to the scope of § 
501(c)(3): "[A]ny contribution to the [sister organization's] activ-
ities would be in furtherance of the plaintiff's purposes as both seek 
the same goal-increased corporate social responsibility .... The 
means employed by the charitable organization to achieve its pur-
poses do not make the end results uncharitable. "134 The IRS with-
drew from its appeal without making any concessions. 
The Center opinion does not eliminate the confusion as to 
whether an organization which is formed to conduct environmental 
litigation may qualify under § 501(c)(3) as a charity. The district 
court's well-reasoned opinion indicates, however, that an organiza-
tion which conducts litigation in an area of public concern or upon 
a subject of public interest should qualify as a charity. Although the 
132 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973). 
133 [d. at 876. 
'34 [d. at 877-78 (emphasis added). 
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opinion appears consistent with Rev. Proc. 71-39 and other public 
rulings by the IRS, the agency has not altered the position expressed 
in the private letter rulings. Thus, to obtain tax-exempt status, 
organizations may have to resort to the courts. The Center opinion 
offers the encouragement that the judiciary may strike down the 
unduly restrictive interpretation of § 501(c)(3) adopted by the IRS, 
thereby establishing that environmental litigation organizations do 
in fact qualify for tax-exempt status. 
IV. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Standing 
The corporation's capability to litigate will be determined by its 
ability to achieve standing to sue. The scope of the standing doc-
trine was liberalized by the Supreme Court in the early 1970's in 
such celebrated cases as Data Processing Service v. Camp, 135 Sierra 
Club v. Morton,136 and United States v. SCRAP. 137 After the above 
decisions were handed down, standing was not an impossible barrier 
in the area of environmental litigation. Standing to sue was obtaina-
ble by alleging that a personal or economic interest of the corpora-
tion or its members was injured by some private or public activity. 
More recent court decisions have refined the standing require-
ment. In denying standing in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee 
to Stop the War,138 and United States v. Richardson,139 the Supreme 
13' 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Data Processing, the Supreme Court handed down a two-pronged 
test for standing. The first was "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," id. at 152, which the 
Court said is required by Article ill of the federal Constitution, restricting access to the courts 
to "cases" and "controversies." Second, the Court said, "The question of standing ... 
concerns apart from the case or controversy test, the question whether the interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by statute or constitutional guarantee in question." [d. at 153. 
,31 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Sierra Club held that where a party does not rely on any specific 
statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing to sue depends 
upon whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary 
context-the form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. The Court stated that 
"aesthetic and environmental well being are interests to be protected, but the person or 
persons seeking review must be among the injured." [d. at 734. 
137 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In SCRAP, standing received its most liberal interpretation. The 
Court held that appellees' pleading sufficiently alleged that they were "adversely affected" 
or "aggrieved" within the meaning of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U.S.C. § 702 (1976), and thus a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of standing to sue 
was properly denied. The appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action of 
the ICC would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources in the Washington 
area. 
,:\8 418 U.S. 208 (1974). The Court held that a taxpayer challenge to the propriety of 
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Court stressed that the injury alleged by plaintiffs must be more 
than a generalized injury suffered by all taxpayers. The injury must 
be concrete and not speculative.l40 
In Warth v. Seldin,141 a 1975 case, the Supreme Court denied 
standing to several groups of plaintiffs challenging an alleged exclu-
sionary zoning ordinance in the town of Penfield, New York. The 
Court held that plaintiffs must specifically allege and demonstrate 
in the complaint that they have been injured and that judicial inter-
vention will provide a tangible remedy for the injury!'2 The Court 
added that when an individual or an association is asserting the 
legal rights of a third party, it is within the judiciary's prudential 
authority to deny these plaintiffs access to the courts.143 
Several commentators have suggested that the trend of the early 
1970's towards a more expansive standing doctrine may have re-
versed direction. l44 However, environmental organizations need not 
be hampered by what seems to be the Court's more sophisticated 
approach to standing. There are a multitude of statutorily created 
interests provided by federal U5 and statel4• environmental statutes. 
The respective environmental statutes provide criteria for determin-
ing who may bring statutory causes of action. Whether an environ-
mental corporation can meet the standing requirements depends on 
the express language of each respective statute and the statutory 
construction given to that language by the courts. 
The corporation's ability to litigate as a private attorney general 
is limited. Possibly under very liberal state statutes such as the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act,147 or a federal statute such 
allowing Congressmen to hold positions in the armed forces did not meet with the standing 
requirements . 
• " 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Richardson involved a taxpayer challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act for not requiring a public accounting of that agency's 
expenditures. The Court held that plaintiffs did not have the requisite standing to bring the 
action . 
• 41 Id. at 170 . 
••• 422 U.S. 490 (1975) . 
•• 2 Id. at 498-9 . 
... Id. at 499 . 
• " See, e.,., O'Keefe, No Standing to Climb Snob's Hill, 62 A.B.A. J. 257 (1976) . 
••• E.,., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970); Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. IT 1972); 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970) . 
... E.,., FLA. STAT. ch. 403 (1975); MICH. COMP.-LAWS ANN. § 691.1207 (Supp. 1975) . 
• <7 Mich. EPA § 2(1), MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1975): 
The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality of a 
political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organiza-
tion or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction 
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as the Clean Air Act of 1970,148 the corporation may be able to 
defend the rights of third parties even though no concrete interest 
of the organization is injured. 
B. Constitutional Rights 
An additional factor which might increase the corporation's abil-
ity to litigate is the existence of a state constitutional right to a 
decent environment.149 Recent state cases indicate that in many 
states which have environmental declarations in their constitutions, 
environmental considerations must be taken into account before 
state agencies can proceed with their projects. 150 In instances where 
where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief 
against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, organization or other legal entity for the protection of the air, water and other 
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. 
". 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-2 (1970) as amended, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977): 
a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil 
action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emmission standard or limitation 
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to 
such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administra-
tor.The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission standard or limitation, 
or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case 
may be. 
See Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The court held that a citizen organization had standing to bring suit without 
alleging an injury in fact because Congress had determined that "any person" was proper 
party to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-2(a). However, the court further held that even 
though this section allows any person to file suit to enforce clean air standards, it does not 
dispense with the necessity that a suit otherwise satisfy traditional concepts of justiciability, 
which, of course, include the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the federal 
Constitution. See also Citizen's Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 
1974) (standing allowed to a citizen's group) . 
• " The following states have an Environmental Bill of Rights in their constitution: Florida 
- Art. n, Section 7; Illinois - Art. XI; Massachusetts - Art. 97 of the Amendments; Michigan 
- Art. IV, Section 52; Montana - Art. XI; New Mexico - Art. XX, Section 21; New York -
Art. XIV; North Carolina - Art. XIV, Section 5; Pennsylvania - Art. C, Section 27; Rhode 
Island - Art. I, Section 17; Virginia - Art. XI. 
... E.g., Commonwealth v. Fox (Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board Docket No. 
73-078). The Department of Environmental Regulation's failure to consider the effects of the 
sewer's construction on erosion, transportation, land use patterns, population density, and 
air and water quality was held by the Board to be in violation of Pennsylvania's Constitution. 
The Department was ordered to take environmental considerations into account. See also 
Flowers v. Northhampton, Bucks County Municipal Authority (Court of Common Pleas, 
1978] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 489 
no environmental considerations were taken into account in agency 
planning, environmental groups have been successful in obtaining 
administrative or judicial orders compelling careful consideration of 
environmental factors. 151 However, if state agencies have taken envi-
ronmental factors into account and have demonstrated a reasonable 
effort to reduce environmental damage, the environmental groups 
generally have not prevailed. 152 
Little reliance can be placed on the federal level for a constitu-
tional right to a clean and healthful environment. Recent court 
decisions have rejected claims that the 5th, 9th, and 14th Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution include substantial envi-
ronmental rights. l53 One court, though, has implied that there may 
be a sound basis for claiming that the right to a clean environment 
is constitutionally protected. ls4 However, that court refused to hold 
that such a right exists on the grounds that it is beyond the province 
of a district court to bestow constitutional protection to the environ-
ment. ISS Consequently, there is currently no case authority support-
Buck Co. 1972), 2 E.L.R. 20313, where the court permitted a suit under the State's environ-
mental amendment requiring the municipal water authority to give "full and good faith 
consideration" to ecological and environmental factors in site selection for wells and water 
tanks. 
,., 1d. 
'52 E.g., Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973). Since the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Transportation indicated it would make substantial efforts to relocate 
historical markers, relandscape affected areas, and replace trees, the court upheld a proposed 
highway construction that would have infringed upon a historic park area; Ely v. Luckhard, 
(Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, August 7, 1973). Virginia had made 
numerous changes in the design of a state penal facility in order to minimize any adverse 
environmental impact that might occur as a result of construction. The court interpreted the 
environmental amendment to the state constitution to require merely that the state weigh 
environmental considerations with other considerations prior to taking any action. Therefore, 
the court concluded that the constitutional provision had not been violated. 
'53 Hagedorn v. Union Carbide, 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.W.Va. 1973). The court denied 
subject matter jurisdiction under the 5th, 9th, or 14th Amendments where plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant's air pollution deprived them of a constitutional right to breath clean air 
and live in a decent environment. In Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), the court 
declined to elevate the right to a decent environment to a constitutional level: "While a 
growing number of commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the 
environment, this newly-advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been accorded judicial 
sanction; and appellants do not present a convincing case for doing so." 1d. at 1139. See also 
Virginians For Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Corps. of Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); 
Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
II. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 
1971). 
, .. 1d. at 739. Nevertheless, the court stated: "Those who would attempt to protect the 
environment through the courts are striving mightily to carve out a mandate from the existing 
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ing the concept of a constitutionally protected environment under 
the federal constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has concentrated on the manner in which one can 
establish a tax-exempt, non-profit environmental corporation under 
local and federal law. In addition, certain jurisdictional problems 
were examined. 
Obviously, the desirability of utilizing the tax-exempt corporate 
model is to provide financing when directly injured individuals lack 
sufficient funds to support litigation. The attorney, however, should 
be aware of the potential problems surrounding creation of the new 
organization. First, the time required to apply for and receive the 
status of a charitable corporation may be substantial. Second, the 
myriad of restrictions placed on the organization by state non-profit 
corporation laws and federal tax laws will require careful planning. 
Third, counsel should be aware that the IRS is apparently not look-
ing with favor on organizations seeking to engage in environmental 
litigation. 
The authors strenuously argue that the current position of the IRS 
with regard to litigation activities is illogical and inconsistent with 
both the statutory and case law surrounding charitable organiza-
tions. The authors believe that this position must soon be reversed. 
Unquestionably, the need exists for public input into the environ-
mental decision-making process. This need, together with the legal 
arguments earlier put forth, clearly gives merit to the concept of a 
non-profit, tax-exempt, contribution-deductible environmental 
corporation. Without continued use of the non-profit corporation, 
the environmental concern of the public will be deprived of the 
most realistic approach for enabling the public to participate in an 
all-important decision-making process. 
provisions of our Constitution. . . Such claims even under our present Constitution are not 
fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one way or another, obtain judicial recognition." [d. 
at 739. The court went on to quote a passage from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Spector 
Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944): "Nor is it desirable for a lower court 
to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb 
of time, but whose birth is distant." [d. 
